INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, customary international law has become a hotly debated subject in the United States, giving rise to new theories on the relationship between international norms and the common law. However, simply because the applicability of customary international norms in U.S. courts has become foggy does not mean that the evolution of customary international norms has slowed, nor that parties in U.S. courts should be hesitant to argue new norms in U.S. state and federal jurisdictions.
This Note argues that the right to an interpreter 1 is a right recognized and protected by customary international law and, as such, can be claimed by individuals in U.S. courts who have suffered a prejudicial violation. The right to an interpreter is generally viewed as a subsidiary right of the right to a fair trial; however, even as a subsidiary right, it is an important and necessary right that is well established by state practice and opiniojuris. Moreover, the right is a more specified and definite norm of customary international law than the right to a fair trial and is thus more easily applicable in domestic jurisdictions, opening up the possibility for new customary international law claims to be made in U.S. courts. 1. For the purposes of this Note, "the right to an interpreter" is used as a general term for the right to language assistance in criminal proceedings, including both oral interpretation and translation of essential written documents, following the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals which have generally considered the right to translation of essential written documents to be a subsidiary right of the broader right to an interpreter. The scope and content of the right to an interpreter is further explained in Part III.A and B of this Note.
The recognition of the right to an interpreter as a norm of customary international law is important both in theory for the elucidation of international law and also in practice for individuals who have suffered a violation but lack an international forum in which they could vindicate their rights. The United States offers some of the strongest fair trial guarantees in the world, and, as a result, parties in U.S. courts can often look to the U.S. Constitution for protection of their due process and fair trial rights. However, in some circumstances, and as will be demonstrated with interpretation rights, international law may offer greater protection of specific fair trial rights, leaving individuals who are unable to argue these rights in U.S. courts vulnerable to a violation without an appropriate domestic remedy. Identifying the right to an interpreter as a right protected under customary international law consequently helps to provide greater protection of such rights for claimants in American courts. Moreover, because the right to an interpreter meets the heightened requirements of general acceptance and specificity set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Maebain, the application of the right may help to reignite the use of customary international norms in the United States.
This Note begins in Part II by arguing that the right to a fair trial is a general norm under customary international law established by state practice and opiniojuris. However, the right to a fair trial is too vague and indefinite to be invoked successfully in national courts, and especially not U.S. courts, which may apply a strict standard for customary international law norms after the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Maebain. Part III finds that the right to an interpreter has sufficient state practice and opinio juris to be considered a right under customary international law independent of the general right to a fair trial, and is not as problematic as the right to a fair trial for application in U.S. courts. Finally, Part IV considers the potential of the customary international right to an interpreter for application in U.S. federal and state courts, arguing that the right to an interpreter likely provides an additional layer of protection for individuals who are insufficiently protected by interpretation standards in federal or state jurisdictions. Ultimately, this Note aims to cement the status of the right to an interpreter as a norm of customary international law, for potential application in both national and international tribunals by individuals who have suffered prejudicial violations of their rights.
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The Right to an Interpreter
I. RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The right to an interpreter is generally viewed as a subsidiary right of the right to a fair trial and is intimately related to some of the essential elements of fair trials, such as the right to prepare an adequate defense and be present in court. 2 Consequently, it is arguable that customary international law provides for language assistance primarily as an implied right under an international customary right to a fair trial. However, individuals who are arguing a violation of the right to an interpreter solely as a subset of the umbrella right to a fair trial face an uphill battle. In order to be considered demonstrative of customary international law, a norm must be supported by state practice and opinio juris,' requirements that the right to a fair trial, in general terms, satisfies. Yet, the right to a fair trial is a right with uncertain scope and content under customary international law and thus is likely not readily applicable in national courts, unlike the customary right to an interpreter.
A. State Practice
In order to give rise to a new rule of customary international law, state practice should be "both extensive and virtually uniform" and should occur "in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law was involved." 4 A survey of the history of the right to a fair trial and its codification in national constitutions demonstrates that there exists among states exactly the kind of general recognition of legal obligation required under customary international law and provides evidence of its extensive and virtually uniform practice. (1993) . Although Prof. Bassiouni's survey of world constitutions did not clearly describe his methodology, it appears that he classified a constitution as explicitly guaranteeing the right to a fair trial if language protecting a "fair trial" or "independent and impartial" tribunal was used, or language with only a slight variance to that effect. Constitutions that do not guarantee fair trial rights in this precise language, but rather contain general due process provisions are noted separately. See, e.g., infra note 127 and accompanying text.
25.
THE CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA July 31, 1981, ch. II § 15(l) . 26 .
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS June 20, 1973, ch. III § 20(l) .
27. Nov. 22, 1966, ch. III § 18(l) .
THE CONSTITUTION OF BARBADOS

28.
BELIZE CONSTITUTION ACT Sept. 21, 1981, pt. II § 6(2). Feb. 7, 2009, pt. 1, tit. IV, art. 120(I) . Note that Prof. Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of Bolivia's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different title.
CONSTITUTION OF 2009 OF THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA
30.
CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Mar., 1965, ch. II § 10(l). 2, 1972 , as amended by Law No. 96-06, Jan. 18, 1996 Note that the Constitution of Cameroon includes the UDHR as an annex, which also guarantees the right to a fair trial in article 10.
CONSTITUTION OF CAMEROON June
32. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, beingSchedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), pt. I § ll(d).
33. CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA Nov. 3, 1978, ch. I § 8(l).
34. CONSTITUTION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC June 13, 2015, ch. II, art. 69(2) . Note that Prof. Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of the Dominican Republic's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different section.
35. Sep. 6, 2013, § 15(l) . Note that Prof. Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of Fiji's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different article. 36.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA 1997, ch. IV § 24(l).
Note that Prof Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of Gambia's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different article. 37.
THE GRENADA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1973, § 8(l). Feb. 20, 1980, art. 144(l 1995, ch. IV § 28(l) . Note that Prof. Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of Uganda's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different chapter.
CONSTITUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA
59.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1971, pt. 3, art. 28. 60. CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA (1996) § 18j) . Note that Prof Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of Zambia's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different article. Also note that Zambia's Constitution was amended on Jan. 5, 2016; however, the amendments do not appear to have altered Part III on fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.
61.
CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE § 69(l). Note that Prof. Bassiouni's study incorporated an earlier version of Zimbabwe's Constitution that also had a fair trial provision but was placed in a different chapter.
62.
For the purposes of this Note, a constitution was considered to explicitly enumerate the right to a fair trial if language guaranteeing a "fair trial" or "independent and impartial" tribunal was used, or language varying only slightly to that effect, in order to replicate as closely as possible Prof. Bassiouni's methods. Constitutions that did not have an exact guarantee of a "fair trial" or trial by an "independent and impartial" tribunal, but contained several provisions that together guaranteed such rights have been noted in the relevant note. See supra note 24; infra note 127 and accompanying text. The right to a fair trial was also enumerated in the 2003 Draft Constitution of the State of Palestine. 125 In addition to protections through the common law, the right to a fair trial is explicitly protected in the United Kingdom through the Human Rights Act of 1998,126 which incorporated the ECHR into British law.
In addition to the almost a hundred countries explicitly protecting the right to a fair trial, other national constitutions contain general due process language that has been interpreted to guarantee fair trial rights, most notably the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees fair trial rights in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. similarly contain general due process language. 138 The Australian constitution does not have an enumerated right to a fair trial, but courts are able to protect fair trial rights through the common law.
39
The constitutions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter D.R.C.), Estonia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Oman do not enumerate the right to a fair trial, but rather explicitly guarantee several subsidiary fair trial rights, such as the right to a speedy and public trial. 140 
Opinio Juris
As evidenced by national constitutions, international treaties and U.N. statutes, fair trial rights have nearly universal protection, satisfying the state practice requirements set out by the I.C.J. Nonetheless, in order to be considered customary international law, a norm must be evidenced not only by state practice, but also opinio juri;, that is, a state's subjective belief that it is bound by the obligation.
155 However, it is less obvious whether states believe fair trial rights to be a norm under international law, as opposed to a protected right under their own national constitutions.
Opinio juris is what distinguishes customary international law from "mere habit or usage, ' customary status through opinio jurs, 15 and particularly difficult to ascertain the subjective views of a state with regard to a norm like the right to a fair trial, as it is explicitly and extensively guaranteed by numerous treaties and declarations. For instance, China is particularly notorious for failing to comply with fair trial rights.
8
Nevertheless, changes were made to the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law in the 1990s to enhance fair trial protections (at least on paper). 159 Consequently, even from a Chinese perspective, it appears that the right to a fair trial entails some sense of legal obligation under international law and before the international community.
160
The overwhelming prevalence of fair trial rights in national constitutions and treaties and the frequency of international condemnations of fair trial violations suggests that the right to a fair trial is subjectively valued by states. 161 Indeed, the fact that the United States in particular internationally condemns other states for fair trial violations is a good indicator that it views the right as a customary international norm, as the two primary sources of international fair trial obligations upon the United States, aside from customary international law, are the UDHR and the ICCPR. However, the debate over the customary status of these documents is likely more disputed than that of fair trial rights.
162
While some commentators argue that the norms contained in the UDHR and ICCPR have "risen to the level of customary international law" 163 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Maehain, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the UDHR and ICCPR could form the basis for customary international law causes of action for the case arising under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 165 The Court ultimately concluded that the UDHR "does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law. '166 In contrast, the Court concluded that the "[ICCPR] does bind the United States as a matter of international law" but that the non-self-executing treaty does not "itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts." 167 Consequently, the Court arguably acknowledged the ICCPR as a source of customary international law, potentially giving rise to fair trial obligations under international norms, while dismissing the UDHR as a source of such obligations.
Sosa, however, is also important for its discussion of the conditions needed for a norm of customary international law to be recognized by U.S. courts. In declining to recognize a norm against the kind of arbitrary detention suffered by Alvarez, the Court introduced two requirements: general acceptance and specificity. 355, 356 (2002) [48.3
The Right to an Interpreter international law must be "accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized." 169 The Court gave the example of piracy as a sufficiently specific norm, and further clarified that "the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should ... involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts." 1 70 While the decision still leaves a number of ambiguities as to the exact levels of general acceptance and specificity that will be sufficient for norm recognition, it indicates that, in the future, customary international norms must meet a substantially heightened standard to be recognized in U.S. courts. Moreover, over time the right to a fair trial has become a more common protected right in national constitutions. While older constitutions, particular the U.S. Constitution, often offer general due process protections, many of the constitutions drafted after colonial occupation or the end of the Cold War explicitly enumerate the right to a fair trial as a fundamental right protected under the constitution, along with rights such as those to life and liberty.
1 7 6 Consequently, states, and especially new states, appear to place increasing importance upon the right to a fair trial over the last few decades, suggesting that while the right may not have been a customary international law norm prior to the Second World War, it is today.
The Right to a Fair Trial as Jus Cogens
Some commentators have gone even further and have concluded that the right to a fair trial it not merely a right under customary international law, but has achieved the status of jus
174.
See (July 27, 2012, 5:14 PM) , http://www.globaltimes.en/content/723603.shtml (arguing that China should respect the rule of law and allow a fair trial in highprofile civil and criminal proceedings in order to respond to international criticism).
175.
However, although the international community in this sense treats the right to a fair trial similarly to the prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial is likely not a peremptory norm of customary international law, or jus cogens, and thus is quite distinguishable from the prohibition of torture. See infra Part I.C.
176.
For instance, the more recently adopted constitutions of Albania, BiH, Croatia, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, and South Sudan enumerated the right to a fair trial as a fundamental right with subsidiary rights, similarly to the structure of fair trial rights in the ICCPR and ECHR. See supra Part I.A.
cogens, a peremptory norm of international law.
7 Fair trial rights would thus join the rank of norms such as the prohibition against genocide and torture as norms from which no derogation is ever permitted. However, while the right to a fair trial is certainly an important right in international law, the right faces an internal limitation that may prevent it from achieving the status ofjus cogens. The right to a fair trial is generally considered to be a derogable right in cases of emergency, for instance codified in Article 4 § 2 of the ICCPR.
178 As a consequence, some commentators argue that the right to a fair trial cannot achieve the status of jus cogens, as it is not absolute.
1 7 9 Nevertheless, while it is contestable whether the right to a fair trial has or even can become jus cogens, as evidenced by state practice and opiniojuris, the right to a fair trial, as a general right, is a protected right under customary international law.
Scope and Content of the Right to a Fair Trial
The right to a fair trial can thus be considered a norm of customary international law. Yet, that conclusion may have little practical meaning for defendants in national courts who have suffered a particular violation of their fair trial rights. While the right is protected almost universally outside of customary international law, the actual scope and content of the right is difficult to ascertain.
180 Indeed, in considering a Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter VCCR) claim in the 2006 Vienna Convention Decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court noted that the right to a fair trial "does not contain explicit rules and prohibitions in detail" and consequently these rules are to be clarified by the national courts.
1 8 1 National constitutions that explicitly guarantee the right to a fair trial vary significantly in terms of the content of the right. Moreover, even amongst the international human rights treaties, there are discrepancies in the criteria required for a fair trial. as existing within fair trial rights, due to discrepancies between civil and common law jurisdictions on the particular content of the right to a fair trial. 18 3 Therefore, even if there is a general right to a fair trial guaranteed under customary international law, it would be difficult to implement such a right in national courts without a guiding treaty such as the ICCPR. More importantly for potential claimants in American courts, the right to a fair trial seemingly lacks the required specificity for an international norm set out in Sosa, which may be fatal if courts interpret the requirements of Sosa to apply beyond ATS cases. 184 As a result, individuals who have suffered violations of the right to a fair trial likely would not be able to rely on that norm alone in national courts due to its lack of clear scope or content. Consequently, there is a need to elucidate the customary international law norms within the right to a fair trial that may independently be considered rights under customary international law, in order to identify those subsidiary rights that may have a greater chance of vindication in national courts than a general customary fair trial norm.
II. RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. State Practice and Opinio Juris
The right to an interpreter is one such right within the broader right to a fair trial that is independently protected as a right under customary international law due to near universal state practice and opinio juri. The exception to the universal codification of the right to an interpreter is the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which does not have an enumerated guarantee of the right to an interpreter under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
1 98 Nevertheless, in 1992 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted a resolution stating that accused persons shall have "the free assistance of an interpreter if they cannot speak the language used in court" due to the relationship of the right to the overarching right to a fair trial. 199 Furthermore, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights found in Malawi African which make up the content or constituent parts of that right are" customary international law).
186.
ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 14, para. 3(f). S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. LANKA Sept. 19, 1978, art. 24(3) . Note that Prof. Bassiouni's study did not list the Sri Lankan Constitution as guaranteeing the right to an interpreter, despite the 1978 Constitution containing an article on language rights in the country generally and language rights in courts specifically. Additionally, the right to an interpreter is explicitly protected in the United Kingdom through the Human Rights Act.
ECHR, supra
35(3)(k).
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI
27 2
In addition to these constitutions that have explicit guarantees to interpretation rights in criminal proceedings, some national constitutions have provisions that would in practice guarantee language assistance for individuals who do not speak the language used in court. Neither the right to an interpreter nor the right to be informed of the charges against oneself in a language one understands are explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, Art. II para. 2 states that the rights and freedoms enumerated in the ECHR, which includes the right to an interpreter, are directly applicable in BiH and have priority over all other law.
2 3 The right to an interpreter is not enumerated in the 2003 Draft Constitution of the State of Palestine or the constitutions of the D.R.C., Eritrea, Namibia, or Switzerland, but in all an accused has a right to be informed of the charges against him in a language he understands. Additionally, language assistance is protected in American Article 5 military tribunals and Combatant Status Review Tribunals for unlawful combatants, 2 8 2 as well as in Canadian military tribunals for unlawful combatant status reviews.
2 83 The protection of the right to an interpreter in such tribunals is interesting, as it suggests that interpretation rights extend to international humanitarian law and may not be derogable in situations where other fair trial rights are.
84
Finally, international courts have demonstrated the existence of international norms regarding language assistance by referencing fundamental judgments from different courts and tribunals.
2 85 This practice indicates that while interpretation rights may be explicitly guaranteed by the JCCPR or a regional human rights convention, the right is sufficiently similar across jurisdictions to be considered not just a statutory right but also an international norm. Furthermore, some commentators have indicated that the right to translation of documents, itself a subset of the right to an interpreter, has reached the status of customary international norm, suggesting that the broader right to an interpreter must have as well.
86
Thus, the right to an interpreter is widely protected by international instruments and national constitutions. Although the right faces the same difficulties for establishing opinio juris as the right to a fair trial, 287 in the case of interpretation rights, where there is little indication that any state could be seen as a persistent objector 281. Exe. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000) ; see GONZALEZ ET AL., supra note 280, at 9-10. [48.3
The Right to an Interpreter in this case, state practice and protection by international instruments may provide sufficient evidence of opinio jurs 88 For instance, it is interesting to note that states which are regularly accused of general fair trial violations such as Azerbaijan and China actually explicitly protect the right to an interpreter in their national 289 constitutions, suggesting that interpretation rights are subjectively valued by states even when the broader fair trial norm is not necessarily. Some commentators have also argued that where there is a great deal of sufficient state practice, there may be less need for evidence of opinio juris, 2 90 although this view has recently been rejected by the International Law Commission. 9 1 Therefore, together, the widespread protection of the right to an interpreter in international instruments and national constitutions and statutes gives substantial evidence of state practice and opinio juris that the right to an interpreter is a norm under customary international law.
B. Scope and Content of the Right to an Interpreter
In addition to satisfying the requirements for customary international norm status of state practice and opiniojuris, the right to an interpreter additionally satisfies the heightened requirements
288.
See Michael B. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 12 (1974) (arguing that a small amount of practice is sufficient to prove a rule of customary international law where there is no evidence presented against it); Scharf, supra note 157, at 312, 314, 316 (noting that international legal custom can be evidenced by silence, inaction, spontaneous compliance, and sufficient representation); see also International Law Commission, supra note 155, 71 (stating that the evidence needed to determine opinio juris may "depend upon the nature of the rule and the circumstances in which the rule falls to be applied.").
289. set out in Sosa for customary international laws to be applied in U.S. federal courts. 292 Although Sosa concerned claims brought under the ATS, 293 and thus its holding may be limited to customary international law claims under the ATS, it is nonetheless important that the right to an interpreter satisfies even the Sosa standards, as it opens the possibilities for claims of interpretation violations to be brought in the United States.
Unlike the right to a fair trial, the right to an interpreter is a more specified right, with more or less consistent definitions between international instruments such as the ICCPR and ECHR and interpretations between international bodies such as the Human Rights Council and ECtHR.
29 4 As an international customary law norm, the right to an interpreter protects the right to language assistance both pre-trial and during trial, and during any interviews or interrogations with authorities. 295 The customary right to an interpreter also imposes a positive obligation upon the competent authorities to independently ensure that the accused is able to understand the proceedings, and thus a violation can occur even when the accused has not notified the court of his difficulties 2 96 or
292.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 293.
Sosa v. Alvarez -Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) . 294.
One area of potential variance between the Human Rights Committee and ECtHR concerns whether the right to an interpreter is an individual right belonging to the accused alone, or a right belonging to the "defense." For instance, in Harward v. Norway, the Human Rights Committee did not find a violation where the accused did not have separate language assistance but the accused's defense counsel could speak the language used in court and could interpret and translate for the accused. See Harward v. Norway, Commc'n No. 451/1991 , 9.5 (Hum. Rts. Comm. July 15, 1994 . In contrast, the ECtHR in Cuscani v. the UnitedIangdom found that the defense counsel's language skills were insufficient protection of the accused's fair trial rights and that the accused should have been provided with a formal interpreter. See Cuscani v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 32771/96, 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 24, 2002) . However, this discrepancy may exist due to the particular facts of the cases, as in Cuscani the defense counsel appeared to have grossly exaggerated his language skills, whereas in Harward the defense counsel was competent in the accused's language.
295. See Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, Commc'n No. 1033 , 7.2 (Hum. Rts. Comm. Aug. 23, 2004 ; Saman v. Turkey, App. No. 35292/05, 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 5, 2011) .
296. However, where the accused makes no challenges to the quality of the interpretation, fails to request a replacement interpreter, and appears to understand the proceedings, the court may assume that interpretation is sufficient, so long as language assistance would have been available had it been requested. Protopapa v. Turkey, App. No. 16094/90, 86 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 22, 2009). [48.3
The Right to an Interpreter when the defense counsel has assured the court that accused does not need language assistance.
297 Finally, the right to an interpreter under international law is an absolute right to free language assistance, regardless of the accused person's finances, and costs cannot be retrieved by the court after the proceedings, even if the accused is convicted.
298
The greatest variation between international instruments with regard to the right to an interpreter is whether an accused person is entitled to the free translation of documents, as some instruments have not explicitly enumerated this right, while others have. 299 However, whether explicitly enumerated as a separate right or found to be an implied right within the right to an interpreter, international courts and tribunals have not substantially disagreed on the scope of translation rights, generally finding that translation is guaranteed as required to safeguard the principles of fairness. 30 Additionally, the scope and content of the right to an interpreter does not vary between civil and common-law jurisdictions. Consequently, the right is more specified and consistent across legal systems than other subsidiary fair trial rights, such as the right to counsel. App. Nos. 6210/73, 6877/77, 7132/75, 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 10, 1978) . The only exceptions to the free provision of language assistance have been seen in the case where the accused has failed to appear at the proceedings. In those cases, courts have found that the accused is entitled to "free" interpretation services when they "appear" in court, and since the accused failed to "appear", he was not entitled to "free" interpretation services. See Fedele v. Germany, App. No. 11311/84, 6 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 9, 1987) .
299. Cf ECHR, supra note 13, art. 6, para. 3(e); Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 67, para. 1(f); see generally Dingfelder Stone, supra note 177, at 159 (describing the scope of the right to translation of documents under the ICCPR and customary international law). 300. Cf Kamasinski v. Austria, App. No. 9783/82, 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 19, 1989); Harward v. Norway, Commc'n No. 451/1991 (Hum. Rts. Comm. July 15, 1994 .
301. While the right to counsel is itself uncontroversial, commentators and courts have disagreed as to whether the right to counsel entails also a right to Moreover, the right to an interpreter also appears to be a non-derogable right in times of emergency. The right to an interpreter is not an absolute right in and of itself; rather it is guaranteed in order to safeguard the right to a fair trial. 302 Consequently, certain limitations may be placed on the right where it causes no prejudice to the accused person or where a balance must be struck between the right to an interpreter and another fair trial right, most often the right to a speedy trial. 0 3 However, even in situations of emergencies and under international humanitarian law, states have protected the right to an interpreter for accused persons .
04
Consequently, the right has a clear scope and definition both in times of emergency and in normal application.
The right to an interpreter is also likely a right that would have been protected at the time of the founding of the United States, since, as a fair trial right, it can be traced to the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, court interpreters have been documented as being used in the United States since at least 1808.305 Thus, defendants claiming a violation of the right to an interpreter in ATS cases might face an easier battle than did the defendant in Sosa in proving a right against arbitrary detention. 306 Moreover, according to Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore, the Court in Sosa implied that state practice, as evidence through national constitutions, "might be influential in establishing that nations had accepted the norm in question, ' 3 07 and may be more valued than inclusion in international instruments such as the ICCPR and UDHR.° Therefore, not only is the right to an interpreter a right protected under customary international law, but also a customary international law norm that may be invoked in U.S. courts even under the stricter requirements set out in Sosa.
III. APPLYING THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER IN U.S. COURTS
The right to an interpreter is thus a norm under customary international law, and one that likely has the sufficient specificity, definition, and state practice to satisfy the requirements of even a Sosa analysis of general acceptance and specificity, 3 09 should that be necessary. Consequently, the right to an interpreter could be invoked as a right under customary international law in U.S. courts, and indeed should be, as the customary international law right to an interpreter likely provides far greater guarantees of language assistance than currently exists in the United States.
A. Federal Courts
The Court Interpreters Act of 1978 goes a long way to guarantee the right to an interpreter in federal courts in comparison to the lack of protection prior to its enactment. However, the Act also leaves much to be desired, 3 10 and provides far fewer guarantees than the customary international law right. Under the Act, an accused is only entitled to interpretation if the need is obvious to the judge or brought to the attention of the judge.
3 11 Consequently, the Act does not impose a positive obligation upon the competent authorities to ensure that the accused is able to fully participate in the proceedings, as the customary norm does. 312 In fact, the Court Interpreters Act Accordingly, most courts have found that the Constitution does not per se require that every accused person who has demonstrated a need for language assistance be provided with it, opening the possibility for a general fair trial violation in addition to failing to meet international standards for interpretation. 314 Aliens are particularly left vulnerable by gaps in the Court Interpreters Act, with the Second Circuit concluding that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is not always required to provide interpreters for aliens, thus leaving aliens especially vulnerable to a violation of their customary international law right to an interpreter. 315 The Court Interpreters Act also does not enumerate a right to translation of documents, and courts have disagreed on what documents an accused is entitled to have translated in order to ensure due process.316 Finally, despite the constitutional requirement for free interpretation services for criminal proceedings in the United States, federal and state courts have often failed to provide free interpretation services for criminal cases, and in particular courts have often tried to recover costs for language assistance from defendants who have not demonstrated their financial need. 317 Therefore, there is both a gap in and a dearth of protection for language assistance in the United States that can be corrected by customary international law. The identification of the right to an interpreter as a norm of customary international law thus does not merely reinforce existing fair trial protections for individuals in the United States, but establishes new standards to which American courts should be held and from which new claims of violation could be brought.
This Note does not aim to weigh in on the considerable debate over the status of customary international law in federal courts. 3 18 Since Sosa this issue has not become any less contested, as "everybody except [Alvarez-Machain] thinks that they won the case." 319 As a result, supporters of the "modern" position reason that Sosa vindicates their argument that customary international law is federal common law.
32° On the other side, "revisionists" also claim a victory, interpreting Sosa as rejecting the "modern" position that customary international law is self-executing federal common law. 321 A third approach argues that customary international law is neither state nor federal law, but "general common law. 322 Thus, much controversy remains over the status of customary international law in U.S. federal courts after Sosa. However, Sosa did not shut the door to such international claims. Provided that the norm alleged meets the requirements set out in Sosa, as the right to an interpreter does, an individual could bring a customary international law claim under the ATS for violations of rights which occurred outside the United States.
2 3 Commentators have also noted that other avenues to federal jurisdiction remain open, such as federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1,324 and that Sosa did not directly address the use of customary international law absent congressional authorization, leaving the door somewhat open for common-law type claims. 325 Consequently, regardless of the relative success of the "modern," "revisionist," or general common law theories in the U.S. Supreme Court, post-Sosa claims of violations of customary international law could likely be brought in U.S. federal courts through one of several different avenues. Customary international law also has not lost its status as a helpful tool for statutory interpretation. 326 Therefore, assuming that the Supreme Court has not completely foreclosed the use of customary international law by federal courts, a claim of a violation of the right to an interpreter may be brought in a U.S. federal court through one of several causes of action.
For instance, a customary international law right to an interpreter might be successfully relied upon in a habeas corpus petition. 28 Moreover, in affirming the judgment on statutory grounds, the Tenth Circuit also noted that "[n]o principle of international law is more fundamental than the concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment, 329 and cited the UDHR and ACHR.
Other Circuits have taken different approaches to customary international law in considering habeas petitions. After noting that international law was controlling only in the absence of a treaty or a controlling executive, legislative or judicial decision, the 11th Circuit in Garcia-Mir v. Meese found that the "reach of international law [was] interdicted by a controlling judicial decision,"33' the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Jean v. Nelson. 331 In the case of a violation of the right to an interpreter, it is not clear whether a court would consider the Court Interpreters Act a controlling legislative decision, as the Act does not fully set out the scope and content of interpretation rights in the United States, and leaves that job to the courts. As a result, it may be possible to rely solely on a customary international law claim in federal courts for a violation of the right to an interpreter, particularly for the right to translation of documents, which is not covered by the Court Interpreters Act. 332 Therefore, while the success of the claim may vary depending on the Circuit and many ambiguities remain post-Sosa, individuals who have suffered a violation of their interpretation rights may be successful in relying on customary international law in U.S. federal courts and should make such arguments, especially where U.S. statutory protections are insufficient in comparison to international norms.
B. State Courts
Although the right to an interpreter is guaranteed by state statutes and common law, the right to an interpreter is also inadequately protected in U.S. state courts, violating both U.S. due process guarantees and customary international law. 333 In addition to suffering from the same deficiencies as federal courts, and especially the failure to provide interpreters free of cost for all accused persons and witnesses, state courts are particularly likely to insufficiently protect interpretation rights due to the substantial variance in standards for interpretation between courts, both interstate and intrastate, despite statutory or common law protections existing in every state. 334 As a result, customary international law could play a significant role in state courts as well as federal courts, by bringing international standards for the right to an interpreter to individuals engaged in proceedings in state courts.
U.S. federal courts have dominated the discussion of customary international law since Professors Bradley and Goldsmith ignited debate in the late 1990s; however, state courts should not be forgotten in the discussion of customary international law. State courts in practice do consider customary international law, 335 and defendants in state courts have a long history of raising customary international law defenses. 336 Since the ATS has been cut back in scope, 337 some commentators believe that there will be an increase in claims brought in state courts for violations of customary international law. 338 One subset of defendants who may wish to raise such customary international law claims in state courts are defendants who have been unsuccessful with VCCR claims. Despite the safeguards provided by the U.S. Constitution, recent history has shown that foreign nationals are particularly susceptible to fair trial violations when facing criminal proceedings in the United States and particular violations of their right to consular notification. 339 Accordingly, the I.C.J. has found that the United States has deprived foreign nationals of their rights under the VCCR in several cases. 40 However, U.S. defendants alleging VCCR violations and attempting to have their I.C.J. judgments enforced in the United States have been largely unsuccessful in federal courts.
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Some state courts, however, have been more favorable to hearing international law arguments, including allegations of VCCR violations. Looking to the I.C.J.'s Avena judgment, in 2005 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently remanded the case of Osbaldo Torres to trial court to consider whether Torres, a Mexican national, was prejudiced by Oklahoma's failure to inform him of his VCCR rights.
342 On remand, the trial court found that Torres was prejudiced due to the VCCR violation, based on a three-prong test that the trial court, and subsequently the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, adopted. 343 In considering the trial court's finding of a violation on appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the test used by the trial court was consistent 339.
Under Article 36 of the VCCR, a foreign national arrested, committed to prison, put in custody pending trial, or detained in any manner, has a right to notify their consular post of their detention without delay, and the arresting authorities should inform the detained individual of this right. See Vienna 
343.
Id. The test considers: (1) whether the defendant did not know he had a right to contact his consulate for assistance; (2) whether he would have availed himself of the right had he known of it; and (3) whether it was likely that the consulate would have assisted the defendant.
Nevertheless, when VCCR rights are violated, other rights are also often implicated and even infringed upon. 61 In the case of Gutierrez, the facts are so peculiar that they likely give rise to not only a violation of the right to consular notification under the VCCR, but also a violation of the right to an interpreter under customary international law. Indeed, Gutierrez's arguments for a violation of the right to an interpreter may be stronger than under the VCCR claim. The facts available indicate that the interpretation provided to the court was insufficient to ensure procedural fairness. Even though the interpreter was interpreting for the judges rather than for Gutierrez, Gutierrez's fair trial rights were still likely infringed upon. The right to an interpreter is not merely a right essential to the accused's ability to participate in the proceedings, but also an essential element of the court and the trier of fact's ability to evaluate the credibility and reliability of witnesses and accused persons. Moreover, international courts such as the ECHR have been sensitive to interpretation violations during particularly critical moments of criminal proceedings, 36 3 and thus the lack of sufficient interpretation during Gutierrez' death penalty hearing may be considered an especially egregious violation under international law. Thus, the facts indicate that the interpretation services provided to Gutierrez would likely be considered a violation of the right to an interpreter in an international tribunal. However, it is unclear whether consular notification would have rectified this issue, as the problematic interpreter was a court interpreter and not an interpreter for Gutierrez. 3 64 Consequently, for a defendant like Gutierrez, where the facts indicate that the defendant suffered prejudice (thereby overcoming the procedural default rule 365 ) and the state court appears favorable to international law claims, a violation of the customary international law right to an interpreter may be easier to establish than a VCCR claim, particularly as the right is also protected, albeit less comprehensively, by the U.S. Constitution and Nevada state law. 366 Alternatively, a defendant could claim a violation of the right to an interpreter under customary international law in addition to a violation of the VCCR, bolstering both international law claims.
CONCLUSION
The right to an interpreter, while not previously identified as such, is well established by both state practice and opimojuris. As a right essential to the broader international law guarantees of a fair trial, the right to an interpreter is longstanding in international law and, particularly, international criminal law. However, unlike the right to a fair trial, the right to an interpreter is both more specified and more readily applicable, consequently giving it a better chance of recognition in U.S. courts. As a result, individuals who have faced substantial difficulties in claiming a treaty-based international law right in U.S. state or federal courts, may have a better chance of success with a customary international law claim. As a customary norm, the right to an interpreter is not limited by the requirements of dualist systems such as the United States for execution of treaties, and consequently, has potentially more value to U.S. claimants than treaty rights only protected under international instruments such as the ICCPR. Moreover, the customary international law right to an interpreter is more comprehensive and offers far stronger fair trial 364. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *11 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012 
